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COMMENTS
"I'LL BE WATCHING YOU": STRENGTHENING THE
EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEABILITY OF STATE
ANTI-STALKING STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago in Vermont, Rosealyce Thayer's 11-year-old
daughter, Caty, was stalked by a man for 19 months and the
police did nothing. One day Mrs. Thayer found Caty organizing
her dolls. When her mother asked her what she was doing, the
little girl said she was deciding which dolls would go to various
friends after the man killed her
Despite Rosealyce Thayer's efforts to protect her daughter
when the police would not, little Caty was kidnapped and later
found dead. She had been raped repeatedly and stabbed.'
Being a celebrity has its price. Fans and other interested observers
regularly invade the private lives of public figures, including entertainment
figures. But upon occasion the invasion becomes more than a mere
interest-it goes one step too far. The fan or other observer may become
obsessed with the subject,2 harassing, threatening, or otherwise placing a
psychological stronghold on the victim. This type of behavior has
generally become known as stalking.' At the hands of a deranged fan,
Rebecca Schaeffer, of the television series My Sister Sam, paid the price of
fame with her life.4 But while stalking "can happen to a star like David
1. 138 CoNG. REc. S9527 (daily ed. July 1, 1992) (legislative day June 16, 1992) (statement
of Sen. Cohen).
2. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
3. While the described behavior is loosely termed "stalking," each of the state anti-stalking
statutes contains a specific definition of what shall constitute "stalking" in that state. See
discussion infra part I (describing the anti-stalking statutes in seven states).
4. Rosalind Resnick, States Enact 'Stalking' Laws; California Takes Lead, NAT'L U., May
11, 1992, at 3. The stalker obtained the actress' address from Department of Motor Vehicles
records. Denise Hamilton, Trial to Begin in Stalking of Weatherman, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1993,
at Jl.
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Letterman, Johnny Carson, or Olivia Newton-John," 5 it can also happen "to
the girl next door.
' 6
The statistics are alarming. According to one major psychiatric study,
there are an estimated 200,000 people in this country who are presently
stalking someone.7 The Senate Judiciary Committee has further deter-
mined that twenty percent of all women will be victims of a stalker at some
point in their lifetimes.8 It is also estimated that "90 percent of all stalkers
suffer from at least one kind of mental disorder, which can include different
forms of obsession and delusion." 9
Further, "Los Angeles may be the nation's capital of stalkings. The
city 'is a built-in playground for these... cases because of the number of
celebrities and prominent people,' says police Lt. John Lane, head of the
nation's only police anti-stalking squad."' Indeed, "so many celebrities
live in... Southern California... because they will be noticed less than
if they were living nearly any other place in the United States.""1
Therefore, it is not surprising that California pioneered the first anti-stalking
law in 1990.
Unfortunately, the introduction of most state anti-stalking bills has
been inspired by local tragedies." California is no exception. Its anti-
stalking legislation was passed only "after four women in Orange County
were killed despite temporary restraining orders against men who were
following them"' 3 and after the well-publicized murder of Hollywood
actress Rebecca Schaeffer by an obsessed fan who had been stalking her.4
5. Sonya Live: Stalking (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 2, 1992).
6. Id.
7. News: Stalking Victims Turn to Congress for Help (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 29,
1992). See also Patricia Davis, New Stalking Law Flushing the Crime Into the Open in Va.,
WASH. POsT, Jan. 24, 1993, at B 1 (statement of Cheryl Tyiska, director of victim services for the
National Organization for Victim Assistance in the District: "It's almost numbing how common
it is .... It's not new; it's just got a new name.").
8. All Things Considered: News (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 29, 1992).
9. Louise Palmer, Maine Woman Stalked For Eight Years, States News Serv., Sept. 29, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File.
10. Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Terror of Stalking; But Some Experts Say
Measures are Vague, USA TODAY, July 21, 1992, at 9A.
11. Celebrity Lives Not All Glamour, UPI, Aug. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
12. Melinda Beck et al., Murderous Obsession, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1992, at 60.
13. 'Anti-Stalking' Laws of Several States in Effect this Week, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1992, at
A14.
14. Resnick, supra note 4, at 3.
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A number of states have followed suit in enacting their own versions
of anti-stalking laws,"5 and California has since amended its original
statute. 6 These statutes have been variously criticized not only for being
ineffective in solving the problems of stalking victims and their families,
but also for being, as one critic put it, "patently unconstitutional."' 7
In response, a federal bill has been passed which directs the Attorney
General, acting through the National Institute of Justice, to develop model
anti-stalking legislation for the states that is constitutional and enforce-
able. The Attorney General has "1 year after... enactment of this Act
[to] report to Congress the findings and the need or appropriateness of
further action by the Federal Government."' 9  The possible future
enactment of federal anti-stalking legislation has also been suggested."o
In the meantime, however, the various states must independently struggle
with drafting effective and enforceable anti-stalking laws to help protect
and assist those who experience the terror of being stalked.
This Comment begins with a discussion of the existing requirement of
physical harm and ineffectiveness of civil restraining orders as factors
which give rise to the need for anti-stalking laws, and identifies the profiles
of those who are stalkers and those who are stalked.2' This Comment
then reviews various state anti-stalking laws beginning with California,
which passed the nation's first anti-stalking law and recently amended its
15. The following states have passed anti-stalking statutes as of January 1, 1993: California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. As this Comment goes to press, several additional states have
anti-stalking statutes under consideration, including Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
16. See discussion infra part m.A.2.
17. Sonya Live: Stalking, supra note 5 (comment of Bob Hassler, National Organization For
Men).
18. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 109(b)(2), 106 Stat. 1828, 1842 (1992)
(introduced by Sen. Cohen on July 1).
19. Il § 109(b)(4).
20. See Paul Hoversten, Hot Lines for Cutting Government Waste, USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 1993,
at 4A (referring to bill introduced in Congress on March 2, 1993, by Sens. Barbara Boxer and
Bob Krueger, which would make stalking a federal crime: "ITlhe bill ... would cover federal
property, crossing of state lines or use of the telephone or mail to harass someone. Penalties
would range from $5,000 fine and up to two years in jail for a first offense to five to 10 years
in jail and up to $200,000 fine for repeat offenders."). A detailed discussion of federal anti-
stalking legislation is beyond the scope of this Comment.
21. See discussion infra part II.
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pioneering legislation.' Certain provisions of the anti-stalking laws in six
additional states-including Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Michigan,
Oklahoma, and West Virginia--are also reviewed.Y Next, this Comment
analyzes basic common issues of the various laws, including possible
deficiencies regarding their effectiveness and constitutionality.' For
example, some statutes may be deemed ineffective because they are too
narrow, while others may be found unconstitutional due to overbreadth,
vagueness, or failure to meet the requirements of procedural due process.'
Finally, this Comment offers some recommendations for the development
of model anti-stalking legislation that may help future state laws become
more effective and enforceable.2
I. BACKGROUND
For eight years, Sandra Poland's daughter Kimberly has
been hounded by a criminally insane man who has sealed his
threats of kidnapping with letters, phone calls and a bloody
arrow lodged in a tree at the end of her driveway.
Although the man has tracked Kimberly from state to state,
hounded family and friends, and been arrested and convicted four
times, the law does not allow the police to protect [Kimberly]
from her stalker, whom she does not know.
... Kimberly has been unable to finish college or pursue her
career, which would involve advertising her whereabouts.27
A. Is There a Need for Anti-Stalking Laws?
1. Existing Requirement of Physical Harm
'Many stalking victims seek police or court protection but are
frequently told that nothing can be done until they are physically harmed
.... And the judicial system traditionally classifies such violence in the
22. See discussion infra part M.A.
23. See discussion infra part IIB.
24. See discussion infra part IV.
25. See discussion infra part IV.
26. See discussion infra part V.
27. Palmer, supra note 9.
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category of a 'domestic dispute. ' ' '" Such domestic disputes have been
frequently ignored because of a misplaced emphasis on the privacy of the
relationship.29 However, "[ilt is estimated that 4... to 8 million women
are victims of domestic violence each year, and that nearly 1,500 women
are killed by their husbands or boyfriends. In fact, domestic abuse may be
responsible for more injuries to women than minor automobile accidents,
rapes and muggings combined."30 These shocking statistics have prompt-
ed one observer to note that "[d]omestic violence is something that is so
ingrained in our society it will take generations to undo the problem."31
"The police worked with me to prevent an assault, but, in the final
analysis said there was nothing they could do until an assault occurred,"
one stalking victim observed.32 The problem is compounded by being not
only legal in nature, but also societal. As one trained listener put it, "It]he
problem is [that] women aren't believed until something physical or visible
happens."33
Kimberly's mother, too, was told by authorities that the family "must
wait for the stalker to do something."' Kimberly's mother eloquently
responded, "[w]hat is the something that they must wait for him to
28. Louise Palmer, Cohen's Anti-Stalking Bill Passes Senate, States News Serv., Sept. 16,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File. Police are usually trained only to look for
physical evidence of violence. According to Thomas Jurkanin, executive director of the Illinois
Police Training Board, in Illinois, "all [police] officers are trained to look for cuts and bruises on
a victim's body, particularly those that might not be readily apparent... to quickly assess the
situation, and make an arrest if there is sufficient physical evidence that an assault has occurred."
Joseph Kirby, Stalking Law Sends a New Signal: Police Upgrading Efforts to Prevent Domestic
Violence, CM. TRIB., Aug. 13, 1992, News, at 1.
29. Joseph Kirby, Law Enforcement Takes a New Approach to Domestic Violence, Hous.
CHRoN., Aug. 23, 1992, at A3 ("what went on between a couple was regarded as nobody else's
business").
30. Kirby, supra note 28, at 1. The American Medical Association has reported that "[n]early
one-quarter of the women in the United States-more than 12 million-will be abused by a current
or former partner at some time during their lives." Lara Gold, Women Who Leave Abusive Men
Sometimes Pay Lethal Price, Gannett News Serv., Aug. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Currnt File.
31. Gold, supra note 30 (quoting Rita De Young, executive director of the Hubbard House,
a shelter and counseling center in Jacksonville, Florida).
32. Women Ask Congress to Protect Victims of Stalkers, Reuters, Limited, Sept. 29, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File.
33. Janice Turner, When Women are Stalked: Being Constantly Watched and Followed is
Called One of the Most Serious Problems Faced by Many Women, Who Argue Authorities Can't
Wait Until There's Outright Violence Before Stepping In to Stop It, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 15,
1992, at F1 (according to a worker with the Assaulted Women's Helpline in Toronto).
34. All Things Considered: News, supra note 8.
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do-kidnap Kimberly, rape Kimberly or kill her? Would you be willing to
sit back and wait for that to happen to your son or your daughter?"35
2. Ineffectiveness of Civil Restraining Orders
'Though the court-issued order of protection is the most common legal
recourse women seek, it has proved to be largely ineffective."3 6  The
increase in the issuance of such orders has been variously attributed to
increased domestic violence "due to economic pressures prompted by the
recession[,]" 37 and to "the fact that women are less intimidated by the
court system and more aware of their legal options."38  However,
"increased public awareness about the availability of civil restraining orders
and the perception that court officials are more willing than ever to process
them may be lulling some women who obtain the orders into a false sense
of security at the most dangerous time of their lives."3 9 Although it is not
entirely clear why, the unfortunate reality is that the issuance of restraining
orders often triggers the violent events they are intended to avoid. Such
violent reactions sometimes even result in fatalities'
Moreover, one legislator has stated, "[wie now know in Massachusetts
that civil restraining orders do not work .... With more than 44,000
receiving restraining orders in the last year, we know it is impossible for
law enforcement and the criminal justice system to take care of every one
35. Id,
36. John W. Fountain & Joseph Kirby, Stalking Victims Find Laws Are Little Help, CM.
TRiB., Aug. 5, 1992, News, at 1. '"llinois State Police figures show 35,346 reported violations
of orders of protection in a five-month period this year. Nearly 8,000 violations occurred in the
month of June alone ... ." Id. Massachusetts reports show that nearly 1,000 women a week are
obtaining restraining orders in that state, an increase of twenty percent from an estimated 840 per
week last year. Bob Hohler, Court's Shield Can Draw a Bullet, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1992,
Metro, at 1. But see U ("The system works for many thousands of women .... ").
37. Adrian Walker, Restraining Orders Are at Record High, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1992,
Metro, at 1.
38. Id.
39. Hohler, supra note 36, at 1.
40. Id. See also Kiley Armstrong, Hate Abounds in the Name of Love, CH. TR., Nov. 23,
1992, News, at 8 ("the obsessive almost is never a 'focused, reality-oriented' person"); Puente,
supra note 10, at 9A ("[A]rresting but failing to prosecute or imprison the stalker ... [is]
perceived ... by the less seriously ill stalker as an angering challenge," according to Park Dietz,
a clinical psychiatrist who has studied stalking behaviors.).
41. See, e.g., Hohler, supra note 36, at 1 (citing example of murder of girlfriend by boyfriend
less than eight hours after court had handed down a restraining order requested by girlfriend);
Beck, supra note 12, at 60 ("[Restraining] orders are notoriously hard to enforce, and all too
often, the first violation is fatal").
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of them."'42 In fact, "about 150 men a week are violating the restraining
orders" in Massachusetts. 43  Thus, while "'[e]verybody kept telling the
victim to run down and get a restraining order.., it wasn't worth the
paper it was written on' because men who violated the orders were rarely
picked up by police.""
Nevertheless, proponents of restraining orders counter that such court
orders have the potential to be effective; the problem, they argue, is that
they are not enforced.45 To this end, prosecutors in Colorado's Arapahoe
County are the first in the country to test the use of an electronic monitor-
ing system to improve the effectiveness of court restraining orders.' In
this county, "[s]talkers accused of violating restraining orders for the second
time can volunteer to wear an electronic ankle bracelet and forego jail time
... will have to pay the $10 daily cost for the bracelet.... [and] [w]hile
wearing the bracelet,.., go through a 12-week 'stabilization' program and
enter therapy."'47 Upon a violation of a court order, an alarm will
electronically alert both the victim and a private monitoring company that
will in turn notify the police.48 However, because most receivers are not
mobile, the victim is still vulnerable to approach by the stalker when away
from home.49
In the end, "[w]hen rage takes over, no document can be an effective
shield.... Everybody feels so helpless .... Even if a woman has an order
of protection, she'd have to have a bodyguard (to stay safe). And who can
afford a bodyguard?"50 However, anti-stalking statutes may provide some
means of intervention before the situation reaches this critical stage.
42. Hobler, supra note 36, at 1 (statement of Rep. Barbara E. Gray).
43. lId (statement of Thomas C. Rapone, Massachusetts' Secretary of Public Safety).
44. Turner, supra note 33, at F1 (statement of Carol Hanson, Florida State Representative).
45. See, e.g., Nightline: Anti-Stalker Laws (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1992)
(statement of Professor Jonathan Turley, George Washington University).
46. Electronic Beeper Eyed for Stalkers, CH. TRiB., Aug. 11, 1992, News, at 6. The device
has been characterized by the under-sheriff of Arapahoe County as being "superb." Cheong
Chow, Abused Women Gain a Weapon; High-Tech Warning System Now on the Market, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 5, 1992, Metro, at 13. A committee of the chief justice's office in Massachusetts
is also studying this idea. Beck, supra note 12, at 60.
47. Electronic Beeper Eyed for Stalkers, supra note 46, at 6.
48. 1l
49. Il Advances in technology now allow a small, hand-held receiver to be used, thus
protecting the victim at a mall, workplace, or anywhere else. Chow, supra note 46, at 13.
50. Joseph Kirby & Flynn McRoberts, Only Bullet Halted Rage of Stalker, Cn. TRm., Aug.
4, 1992, News, at 1 (quoting Barbara Green, a volunteer at LifeSpan, a women's advocacy and
counseling group in Des Plaines).
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B. Who Are the Stalkers?
Forensic psychiatrists have examined profiles of stalkers, and at least
one has identified that 9.5% of stalkers studied are obsessed with erotoma-
nia (i.e., the stalker "falsely believes that the target, usually someone
famous or rich, is in love with the stalker"); 43% are love obsessed (i.e.,
the stalker "is a stranger to the target but is obsessed and mounts a
campaign of harassment to make the target aware of the stalker's exis-
tence"); and 47% are suffering from simple obsession (i.e., the stalker,
"usually male, knows the target as an ex-spouse, ex-lover or former boss,
and begins a campaign of harassment").
51
C. Who Are the Stalked?
Forensic psychiatrists have also studied profiles of stalking victims,
and at least one has identified that 49% of the victims are celebrities and
other entertainment figures (with 32% being lesser known entertainment
figures and 17% being highly recognizable celebrities); 38% are ordinary
citizens; and 13% are former employers and other professionals.5 2
iH. THE STATUTES
"When I hit the light switch, I was looking him eye to eye.
He had a claw hammer drawn back in his hand and he came
down on my head with force. He had a stun gun or an electric
shocker or something. He stuck me in my chest, in my legs.
Then he picked the hammer up and then he beat me."
Jimmie suffered severe head injuries. Several days later, she
told a counselor that she had begged authorities for protection
before the attack but was told no laws had yet been broken.1
3
51. Puente, supra note 10, at 9A (specifying the source as Michael Zona, forensic
psychiatrist).
52. Id. Anti-stalking statutes are aimed at protecting various classes of persons, such as
"youths who reject gang membership and suffer harassment as a result[,]" Julie Mason, Stalking
Ordinance Proposed, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 10, 1992, at A34; abortion providers who suffer
harassment from anti-abortion protestors, Bob Ortega, Stalking Laws Used to Fight Abortion
Woes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1993, at B1; and judges who suffer harassment from defendants they
have sentenced. The Judge as Victim; She Tells Her Own Story to Push Anti-Stalking Bill, STAR
TRB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 20, 1993, at IA.
53. World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 11, 1992).
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A. The California Statute
1. The Pioneering Statute
a. Notable Characteristics
California passed the nation's first anti-stalking law in 199 0.' Its
legislators' pioneering efforts focused on following or harassment activity
which is intentional, repeated, accompanied by a credible threat of death or
great bodily injury, and causes the victim substantial emotional distress
which is both actual and reasonable.5 Conduct that occurs during labor
picketing56 or otherwise serves a "legitimate purpose,"57 a term which is
not defined in the statute, was excepted from coverage.
b. Summary of Statute
The original California statute defined stalking as "willfully, malicious-
ly, and repeatedly follow[ing] or harass[ing] another person and . . .
mak[ing] a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable
fear of death or great bodily injury ... .,5 The term "harasses" was
defined to mean
a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific
person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,
and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct
must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial
emotional distress to the person. 9
A "credible threaf' was defined to mean "a threat made with the intent and
the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause.., the target of
the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be
against the life of, or a threat to cause great bodily injury to, a person
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1992) (added by 1990 Cal. Stat. 1527, § 1); Resnick,
supra note 4, at 3.
55. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
56. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
57. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West 1992).
59. l § 646.9(d). The phrase "course of conduct" was defined to mean, "a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a
continuity of purpose." Il The statute specifically excludes "Ic]onstitutionally protected activity"
from the meaning of the phrase "course of conduct." Id
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... ."I "Conduct which occurs during labor picketing" was specifically
exempted from the purview of the statute.61
The California statute provided for increased penalties for violation
when a temporary restraining order or injunction was in effect at the time
of the violation,62 or where there was a second or subsequent conviction
against the same victim.63 However, even the first or lowest level of
conviction provided for the possibility of imprisonment.'
2. Recent Amendment
California recently passed an amendment to its anti-stalking statute.6
The bill made a number of changes to the existing statute, broadening its
scope and generally bolstering its effectiveness. The bill redefined
"credible threat" to encompass threats made not only to a given person, but
also to a member of that person's immediate family.' A second or
subsequent conviction against the same person or a member of that person's
family is now a straight felony, rather than a discretionary felony or
misdemeanor.67 Also, a conviction in violation of any court order, not
limited to a temporary restraining order or an injunction, results in a
misdemeanor or a felony, as specified by the statute." Additionally,
probation shall be conditioned on "participat[ion] in counseling, as
60. Id § 646.9(e).
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1992).
62. The California statute provides that "when there is a temporary restraining order or an
injunction, or both, in effect prohibiting [stalking] against the same party, [stalking] is punishable
by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars ... or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state
prison." Id. § 646.9(b).
63. The California statute provides that
[a] second or subsequent conviction occurring within seven years of a prior
conviction under [the stalking statute] against the same victim, and involving an act
of violence or "a credible threaf' of violence, as defined in subdivision (e), is
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine
of not more than one thousand dollars .... or by both that fine and imprisonment,
or by imprisonment in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(c) (West 1992).
64. Id § 646.9(a).
65. S. 1342 (introduced by Sen. Royce on Jan. 29, 1992) (passed the California Assembly
July 20, 1992 and passed the California Senate on Aug. 13, 1992), codified at CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 646.9 (Deering Supp. 1993).
66. Id § 1(a).
67. Id § 1(d).
68. Id § 1(b).
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designated by the court. However, the court, upon a showing of good
cause, may find that the counseling requirement shall not be imposed."'69
Finally, the court may issue a restraining order effective for up to 10
years." In considering the length of such a restraining order, the court
must consider "the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability
of future violations, and the safety of the victim and his or her immediate
family."
71
B. Other Representative Statutes
1. Connecticut
a. Notable Characteristics
The Connecticut statute, approved June 9, 1992, does not contain a
credible threat requirement.7' The statute is two-tiered,73 specifying
stalking a child under sixteen years of age constitutes a more serious
crime.74
b. Summary of Statute
The two levels of stalking identified in the Connecticut statute result
in the application of either misdemeanor or felony penalties, depending on
the level of crime committed.75 Stalking in the second degree is classified
as a misdemeanor,76 while stalking in the first degree is classified as a
felony.' Stalking in the second degree requires that a person "with intent
to cause another person to fear for his physical safety,... wilfully and
repeatedly follows or lies in wait for such other person and causes such
other person to reasonably fear for his physical safety."'78 Stalking in the
first degree requires that a person "commit[] stalking in the second degree
69. Il § 1(h).
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (Deering Supp. 1993).
71. Id.
72. See discussion infra part II.B.I.b.
73. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
74. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
75. 1992 Conn. Pub. Acts 237.
76. Id. § 2(b).
77. Id. § l(b).
78. Id. § 2(a).
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... and (1)... [have] previously been convicted [of a stalking offense],
or (2) such conduct violat[ing] a court order in effect at the time of the
offense, or (3) the other person [being] under sixteen years of age."79
2. Florida
a. Notable Characteristics
The Florida statute, approved April 13, 1992,8° has been described as
being "one of the toughest in the nation.""1  A credible threat is not
required for simple stalking. 2 The statute does not require that a victim's
reaction be reasonable or limited to fear of physical harm; rather, any form
of substantial emotional distress actually experienced by the victim is
encompassed.83 The Florida statute also allows warrantless arrests for
misdemeanor violations upon a showing of probable cause, without
catching the suspect in the act,' a provision which critics have described
as unconstitutional.85
b. Summary of Statute
The preamble to Florida's anti-stalking statute states the legislative
finding that "the traditional protections currently available under criminal
statutes are not always applicable to stalking." 6 Under the Florida statute,
stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree, occurs when a person
"willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another
person."87 And aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, occurs
when a person commits stalking "and makes a credible threat with the
79. Id. § 1(a).
80. See discussion infra part mI.B.2.b.
81. Stalking Law May Be Strengthened, UPI, Sept. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Curmt File.
82. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
83. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
84. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Resnick, supra note 4, at 3.
86. 1992 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 208 (West).
87. Id. § 2. The term "harasses" is defined under the Florida statute to mean, "to engage in
a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such
person and serves no legitimate purpose." IL § 1(a).
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intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury"8
or "after an injunction for the protection against repeat violence.., or an
injunction for the protection against domestic violence ... or after any
other court imposed prohibition of conduct toward the subject person or
that person's property[.]" 9 The Florida statute provides for warrantless
arrests whereby "[a]ny law enforcement officer may arrest, without a
warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to believe has violated the
provisions of this [statute]."'
3. Illinois
a. Notable Characteristics
The Illinois statute, approved July 12, 1992,91 limits its scope to
situations where the requisite threat precedes repeated instances of
following or surveillance activity.' In this state, all stalking offenses are
classified as felonies.93 Illinois enumerates several criteria that its courts
may consider in setting bail for accused stalkers. 4
b. Summary of Statute
The Illinois law creates the offenses of stalking (a class four felony,
with second or subsequent convictions resulting in a class three felony)"
and aggravated stalking (a class three felony, with second or subsequent
88. Id § 3. The term "credible threa' is defined under the Florida statute to mean "a threat
made with the intent to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his
or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a
person." Id § 1(c).
89. 1992 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 208, § 4 (West).
90. Id. § 5.
91. See discussion infra part mH.B.3.b.
92. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
94. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
95. 1992 Ii. Laws 870, § 12-7.3(b). The sentence for a class four felony "shall be not less
than 1 year and not more than 3 years." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(7) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992). The sentence for a class three felony "shall be not less than 2 years and not
more than 5 years" Id. at para. 1005-8-1(a)(6).
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convictions resulting in a class two felony).' For either crime, an
exemption exists for "picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise
lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute."'  The crime of
stalking requires a threat first, followed by at least two instances of
following or placing the victim under surveillance." The crime of
aggravated stalking is committed when a person "in conjunction with
committing the offense of stalking, also does any of the following: (1)
causes bodily harm to the victim; (2) confines or restrains the victim; or (3)
violates a temporary restraining order, an order of protection, or an
injunction prohibiting the behavior described .... ",
The Illinois statute allows the court to deny bail for "stalking or
aggravated stalking, where the court, after a hearing, determines that the
release of the defendant would pose a real and present threat to the physical
safety of the alleged victim of the offense and denial of bail is necessary
to prevent fulfillment of the threat upon which the charge is based."'"
The burden of proof for denial of bail is upon the State.' In determin-
ing whether a defendant poses a real and present threat to the physical
safety of the alleged victim of the case, the court may consider a number
of factors.'°2
96. 1992 I. Laws 870, § 12-7.4(b). See supra text accompanying note 95 (specifying
sentence for class three felony). The sentence for a class two felony "shall not be less than 3
years and not more than 7 years." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(5) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992).
97. 1992 11. Laws 870, §§ 12-7.3(c), 12-7.4(c).
98. "Stalking" is committed when:
[a person] transmits to another person a threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable apprehension of death, bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or
restraint, and in furtherance of the threat knowingly does any one or more of the
following acts on at least 2 separate occasions: (1) follows the person, other than
within the residence of the defendant; (2) places the person under surveillance by
remaining present outside his or her school, place of employment, vehicle, other
place occupied by the person, or residence other than the residence of the defendant.
Id § 12-7.3(a). "He could follow her, or go to her house, but that's not stalking, even if he does
it 50 times, until there's a threat." Jennifer Lenhart, Cops Beginning to Get Handle on Stalking
Law, Cm. TRm., Nov. 30, 1992, Chicagoland, at 1.
99. 1992 I1. Laws 870, § 12-7.4(a).
100. Id. § 110-4(a). Cf. 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. 2025, § 2 (West) (approved Apr. 29, 1992)
(creating a presumption, in Iowa, of ineligibility for ball in felony cases of stalking).
101. 1992 ill. Laws 870, § 110-4(d).
102. The factors that an BIlinois court may consider in setting bail are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged;
(2) the history and characteristics of the defendant including:
(a) any evidence of the defendant's prior criminal history indicative of
violent, abusive or assaultive behavior, or lack of that behavior... ;
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The Illinois statute also provides for possible mental health treatment
for defendants found guilty of stalldng or aggravated stalking whereby "the
court may order the Prisoner Review Board to consider requiring the
defendant to undergo mental health treatment... as a condition of parole
or mandatory supervised release."' 3
4. Michigan
a. Notable Characteristics
The Michigan statute, effective January 1, 1993, is the most recent of
those examined in this Comment, and also the broadest in scope.) 4  It
does not require a credible threat for simple stalking, but instead focuses on
repeated "unconsented contact" as the basis for the crime. 5 Un-
consented contact includes not only physical approaching, but also
approaching by telephone, mail, electronic media, or other means." 6 The
statute encompasses all forms of significant emotional harm as long as such
harm is actually and reasonably experienced by the victim."7 The
penalties specified are among the stiffest of any state anti-stalking
statutes."°8 The statute does not specify an intent requirement."
(b) any evidence of the defendant's psychological, psychiatric or other
similar social history that tends to indicate a violent, abusive, or assaultive nature, or
lack of any such history.
(3) the nature of the threat which is the basis of the charge against the defendant;
(4) any statements made by, or. attributed to the defendant, together with the
circumstances surrounding them;
(5) the age and physical condition of any person assaulted by the defendant;
(6) whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapon or
weapons;
(7) whether, at the time of the current offense or any other offense or arrest, the
defendant was on probation, parole, mandatory supervised release or other release
from custody pending trial, sentencing, appeal or completion of sentence for an
offense under federal or state law;
(8) any other factors... deemed by the court to have a reasonable bearing upon
the defendant's propensity or reputation for violent, abusive or assaultive behavior,
or lack of that behavior.
Ld. § 110-6.3(b)(4)(D).
103. Id. § 3-14.5.
104. See discussion infra part I.B.4.b.
105. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
106. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
107. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
108. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
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b. Summary of Statute
The Michigan anti-stalking statute has two tiers: stalking, which is
classified as a misdemeanor, and aggravated stalking, which is classified as
a felony.1 If convicted of aggravated stalking, a defendant faces up to
five years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both."'
The first tier, "stalking," requires a series of "two or more separate
noncontinuous acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose"112 of "un-
consented contact" which would cause a reasonable person to experience
fear or significant mental suffering, and that actually causes subjective fear
or significant mental suffering on the part of the victim."3 "Unconsented
contact" is defined to include not only following or physical approaching,
but also contact by telephone, mail, or electronic communications, as well
as placing an object on or delivering an object to property owned, leased,
or occupied by the victim."' Intent to cause such fear or significant
mental suffering is not required under the law. 5
The second tier, "aggravated stalking," requires stalking activity plus:
(1) violation of a restraining order of which the defendant had actual notice,
an injunction, or a preliminary injunction; (2) violation of a condition of
probation, pretrial release, or release on bond pending appeal; (3) making
of one or more credible threats of death or physical injury against the
victim, a member of the victim's family, or another individual living in the
victim's household; or (4) a previous conviction under the state's anti-
stalking statute.1
6
The Michigan anti-stalking law provides that repeated unconsented
contact with the victim, after being asked by the victim to discontinue the
contact, results in a rebuttable presumption that the victim experienced
subjective fear or emotional distress. 7
109. See discussion infra part IV.C.
110. 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 261; News: Michigan Legal System Takes Stalking Very Seriously
(CNN television broadcast, Jan. 1, 1993).
111. 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 261, § 1(3).
112. Id. § 1(1)(A).
113. Id. § 1(1)(E).
114. Id. § 1(1)(F).
115. See News: Michigan Legal System Takes Stalking Very Seriously, supra note 110 ("The
law sponsor says intent is not a requirement before a suspect can be arrested.").
116. 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 261, § 1(2).
117. Id. § 1(5).
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5. Oklahoma
a. Notable Characteristics
The Oklahoma statute, approved April 20, 1992,"1 expands the
general class of persons who may be considered a target of stalking by
encompassing activity directed not only against a specific person but also
against a member of that person's immediate family."9 A definition of
the phrase "member of the immediate family" is offered to provide
guidance in interpretation."
b. Summary of Statute
In Oklahoma, stalking is committed when a person "willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses12 ' another . . . and . . .
makes a credible threat [against another] .... .""n The crime of stalking
may be committed not only against a particular person, but also against a
member of that person's immediate family." The phrase "member of
the immediate family" is defined to mean, "any spouse, parent, child,
person related within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity or any
other person who regularly resides in the household or who regularly
resided in the household within the prior six (6) months."'24
Under a related Oklahoma statute, "[i]n addition to any other penalty
specified .... the court may require a defendant to undergo the treatment
118. See discussion infra part I.B.5.b.
119. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
120. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
121. The term "harasses" is defined under the Oklahoma statute as:
[A] knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which
seriously alarms or annoys the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The
course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial distress to the
person.
1992 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 107, § I(E)(1) (West).
122. Id § I(A). The term "credible threat' is defined under the Oklahoma statute as:
[A] threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as
to cause... the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or for the
safety of a member of his or her immediate family. The threat must be against the
life of or a threat to cause great bodily injury to a person.
Id. § l(E)(3).
123. Id.
124. Id. § l(E)(4).
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or participate in the counseling services necessary to bring about the
cessation of... stalking... the victim.""
6. West Virginia
a. Notable Characteristics
The West Virginia statute, enacted in 1992, l" is notable because it
restricts application of its provisions to activities directed against former
cohabitants or sexual or intimate partners only." Also, conviction of any
form of stalking committed in this state results only in misdemeanor
penalties.' s
b. Summary of Statute
West Virginia also uses a two-tiered approach to stalking crimes, with
enhanced penalties for violation of the statute when a temporary restraining
order, restraining order, or both, are in effect at the time the crime is
committed. 29 However, violation of either tier of the stalking crime
results only in misdemeanor penalties. 3 The West Virginia statute by
its own terms limits the application of its stalking law to crimes committed
against a former cohabitant or sexual or intimate partner.'
IV. ANALYSIS
"He threatened and terrified me for months. The police told
me he's being treated as a schizophrenic. I talked to a psycholo-
gist, and he told me that a schizophrenic is not someone to fool
around with. "
125. 1992 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 42, § 5() (West).
126. See discussion infra part mI.B.6.b.
127. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
129. W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a(b) (1992).
130. Ma § 61-2-9a(a), (b).
131. The West Virginia statute provides that "stalking" is committed when "[any person who
... intentionally and closely follow[s], lie[s] in wait, or make[s] repeated threats to cause bodily
injury to any person with whom that person . .. formerly engaged in a sexual or intimate
relationship, with the intent to cause... said person emotional distress or... fear of ... personal
safety ... ." Id. § 61-2-9a(a).
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... [Tihe only charge Nancy could bring against him was
telephone harassment, a misdemeanor
The judge decided that Nancy and the obscene, threatening
caller should go to mediation.
... What sort of agreement do you strike with a stranger
who makes obscene, menacing phone calls? Does a woman say:
"OK, I'll listen to you pant for two minutes if you agree not to
call when I'm sleeping or at my place of employment, and if you
sign a contract saying you will never jump out of the gangway
and hit me on the head. Deal?
13 2
A. Effectiveness
1. Persons Affected Under the Statutes
Some state anti-stalking statutes may be too narrow, and thus, lacking
in effectiveness. Some may be overly narrow with respect to potential
defendants. For example, West Virginia's statute applies only to defendants
who commit crimes against a former cohabitant or sexual or intimate
partner.133  The statute ignores the reality that many stalkers approach
persons with whom they have not lived or been intimate with, let alone
ever met. Thus, stalkers who harass certain other common victims, such
as former employers, celebrities, and even former dates who have not been
sexual or intimate partners, would not be punished under the West Virginia
statute."M To be more effective, some of the applicable statutes may need
to be broadened to include a larger class of defendants, and not only
132. Mike Royko, Mediation Order is an Obscene Call, CMr. TRIB., Sept. 18, 1992, News,
at 3. The judge in this case, who said he gets 150 cases per day, initially did not remember the
case but then said, "I was told there was a relationship ... I thought there was some
relationship," id., "[b]ut Nancy has no relationship with the man, other than to pick up the phone
and get seared out of her wits." Id.
133. W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a(b) (1992).
134. "[Mjost stalking cases break down into three categories: domestic violence, work-place
harassment, or stalking of a famous person such as a movie star." Elizabeth Ross, Problem of
Men Stalking Women Spurs New Laws, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 11, 1992, at 6 (statement
of Alana Bowman, deputy city attorney and supervisor of the domestic violence unit in Los
Angeles).
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defendants who approach former spouses and cohabitants. Statutes drafted
in this manner would more accurately reflect actual stalking behavior.
35
Also, some of the statutes may be overly narrow with respect to who
may be considered targets of stalking. While some of the anti-stalking
statutes as drafted provide recourse for family members of victims or other
persons close to the victims, including the statutes in Oklahoma and
California, many do not.136 Opponents to the proposition of enlarging the
statutes to provide recourse for family members and certain other individu-
als might argue that it is sufficient if victims themselves are adequately
protected under the statutes. However, this fails to address harm that is
likely present for an individual when, for example, threats are made against
that individual's child or close relative. As will be discussed infra, statutes
can be effectively drafted to address this potential harm. 37
2. "Credible Threat" Requirement
Another example of why most state anti-stalking statutes may be
considered overly narrow is the inclusion of a "credible threat" require-
ment. 38 The threat required is typically that of death or great bodily
injury to the victim. 139 Proponents of a credible threat requirement might
argue that without such a requirement innocent activity or mistakes could
be punished."4 The focus of such a complaint would likely be that what
135. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (Oklahoma statute); note 66 and
accompanying text (California statute, as amended).
137. See infra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., discussion supra part InI.A (California statute). The Connecticut, Florida and
Michigan statutes are notable exceptions. See discussion supra part ll.B.1 (Connecticut statute);
part Im.B.2 (Florida statute); part m.B.4 (Michigan statute).
139. See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text (California statute). Illinois specifically
requires that a threat precede surveillance or following activity. See supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Morning Edition: Anti-Stalking Laws Considered by Virginia (NPR radio
broadcast, Mar. 10, 1992).
[A] lot of innocent people may end up being victimized by this type of a statute. If
you have, for instance, a domestic dispute where a husband or a wife is angry at the
other spouse, they can call the police and say, "Well, my spouse or my former
spouse walked around the house and he knew that I would be frightened by this and
it scared me."
Id. (statement of Nina Ginsberg, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). See also
Nightline, supra note 45 (statement of Professor Jonathan Turley, George Washington University:
"mhis system essentially criminalizes mere presence ...in an area, when coupled with
reasonable fear in the accusing parties.. ").
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is or is not following, "harassing, annoying or bothersome" activity "is
merely a question of one's own interpretation.""14 One state court which
has reviewed such an argument has stated that, "[p]resumably what
appellant means... is that... the defendant will never know if he is
committing a crime or not. The fallacy in this theory is that the victim's
subjective ideas on what is or is not harassing are not in issue."142 In
dismissing the appellant's constitutional challenge, the court noted, "[tihe
point is that the defendant .. . intend[s] to harass and the defendant
certainly knows if he is doing that."'4 Therefore, if anti-stalking statutes
are drafted to contain specific requirements of intent, the argument that
innocent activity or mistakes might be punished under the statutes is greatly
weakened.
Moreover, there are two significant reasons why the requirement of a
credible threat in anti-stalking legislation is particularly troubling. First,
recent scientific studies"4 have shown that, despite most people's
intuition, there may be no association or even a negative association
between the sending of threatening and otherwise inappropriate letters to
Hollywood celebrities and members of the United States Congress,
respectively, and actual approach behavior.45 Behavior which indicates
the likelihood of an individual approaching a subject can be thought of as
141. Constantino v. State, 255 S.E.2d 710, 713 (Ga. 1979).
142. ld.
143. lId (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d
Cir. 1978) (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945) ("[W'here the
punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the
statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the
act which he does is a violation of law.")).
144. See, e.g., Park E. Dietz et al., Threatening and Otherwise Inappropriate Letters to
Hollywood Celebrities, 36 . FORENSIC SCL 185 (Jan. 1991) [hereinafter Hollywood Study]. While
the studies are fairly thorough, being based on six years of research, i& at 186, the results are
subject to certain research limitations. The authors have identified certain systematic biases in
the studies as being probable, including the following:
(1) the most severely disorganized letter writers may be underrepresented because
they more often fail to mail, address, or stamp their letters; (2) the most subtle
degrees of inappropriateness are probably underrepresented because they do not meet
the screener's threshold for referral; and (3) the most overtly threatening, ominous,
and fear-arousing letters are probably overrepresented.
lad at 189.
145. See id. at 208; Park E. Dietz et al., Threatening and Otherwise Inappropriate Letters to
Members of the United States Congress, 36 J. FORENSIC Sci. 1445, 1466 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter
Congressional Study].
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"approach positive" behavior." Similarly, behavior which indicates that
an individual is less likely to approach a subject can be considered
"approach negative" behavior. 47
In a study of persons sending threatening and otherwise inappropriate
letters to Hollywood celebrities [hereinafter Hollywood Study], "[t]he most
important of the negative findings [was] the lack of association between
verbal threats and approach [positive] behavior."1  And in another study
of persons sending threatening letters to members of the United States
Congress [hereinafter Congressional Study], individuals "were significantly
less likely to pursue a face-to-face encounter with him or her. Subjects
who sent inappropriate letters that contained no threats were significantly
more likely to pursue a face-to-face encounter."'49 In the Congressional
Study, although certain factors may seem counter-intuitive,
[elach of the following aspects of threats, taken alone, was
significantly associated with [approach negative behavior]:
threatening any kind of harm toward any public figure; threaten-
146. The authors of the scientific studies explain their classification system for approach
positive behaviors, as follows:
A subject was classified as "approach positive" if known to have (1) visited a
location believed to be the home of the celebrity; (2) visited any agency believed to
represent the celebrity; (3) visited a location believed to be the home or business
address of any acquaintance, friend, relative, or intimate of the celebrity; (4)
approached within five miles of any of the above locations with the expressed intent
of seeing, visiting, or confronting any of the above parties; (5) traveled more than
300 miles to see the celebrity or any of the above parties, even in a public
appearance; or (6) behaved in any manner out of the ordinary at any public
appearance of the celebrity.
Hollywood Study, supra note 144, at 187. See also Congressional Study, supra note 145, at 1447
(explaining similar classification system for behavior by persons toward members of Congress).
147. The authors of the scientific studies explain their classification system for approach
negative behaviors, as follows:
A subject was classified as "approach negative" if he or she had sent inappropriate
materials to the celebrity but had not met any of the above criteria for an approach-
positive case. A subject who had written and who also attended a public perfor-
mance would still be classified as approach negative if the subject traveled less than
300 miles to see the celebrity and behaved appropriately there.
Hollywood Study, supra note 144, at 187. See also Congressional Study, supra note 145, at 1447
(explaining similar classification system for behavior by persons toward members of Congress).
148. Hollywood Study, supra note 144, at 208. Moreover, "[tihis finding held true through
many attempts to disprove it by testing every aspect of threatening statements for which we could
create a measure." Id. See also Fountain & Kirby, supra note 36, at 1 (statement of Lt. John
Lane, Los Angeles Police Department, Threat Management Unit: "The problem is that oftentimes
suspects don't overtly communicate a credible threat to our victims... ").
149. Congressional Study, supra note 145, at 1466 (emphasis in original).
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ing to kill any public figure or those around a public figure;
indicating that a threat would be executed by the subject or his
agent; indicating that a threat would be executed by someone
other than the subject or his agent; making any direct threat;15°
making any veiled threat;"' making any conditional threat;
15 2
and making any implausible threat. 53
Similar studies have not yet been undertaken with respect to inappropriate
mail sent to religious or business leaders or to private individuals."5
Therefore, "[those who rely on the presence or absence of threats in
making judgments about what to do are making a serious mistake." '55 Of
course, such a notion "contradicts a vast body of assumptions that is relied
on each day in judging whether harassing communications warrant concern,
notification of the police, security precautions, or investigation." '56 But,
"[u]nfortunately, this error is codified in the criminal law, which recognizes
various types of verbal threats as unlawful but does not accord equal
recognition to harassment without threats, even though the latter often poses
an equal or greater danger of harm to persons or property."
157
The second reason why the inclusion of a credible threat requirement
in most anti-stalking statutes is troubling is that severe emotional distress
felt by a victim absent an explicit threat of physical harm is simply left
unaddressed. There are many situations where extreme emotional distress
may occur without an explicit threat of physical violence. For example, if
an individual receives multiple telephone calls a day from a silent or
screaming caller, and also repeatedly receives upsetting doorstop deliveries
150. A "direct threaf' includes "straightforward and explicit statements of an intention to
commit harm that do not state conditions that might avert the harm (for example, 'I'm going to
kill you')." Hollywood Study, supra note 144, at 203.
151. A "veiled threat" includes "indirect, vague, or subtle statements suggesting potential
harm that do not state conditions that might avert the harm (for example, 'There's no saying what
might happen')." Id
152. A "conditional threaf' includes "statements portending harm and specifying either
conditions to be met in order to avert the harm or conditions under which the threat will be
carried out; usually such threats use the words, 'if,' 'if not,' 'or,' 'or else,' 'unless,' or
'otherwise."' Id. at 204.
153. Congressional Study, supra note 145, at 1463. An "implausible threat" includes "curses
or hexes, [threats] evidenc[ing] a psychotic notion of causation, or . . . [threats which are]
technically impossible." Hollywood Study, supra note 144, at 204.
154. Hollywood Study, supra note 144, at 208. "[I]t remains to be seen whether the results
can be generalized to communications received by other groups of public figures, such as...
religious, or business leaders." Id.
155. Ia
156. Id.
157. 1& See also supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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(such as a chocolate box filled with spiders), that individual would likely
be found to suffer continuing severe emotional distress even under a
stringent reasonable person standard.
158
3. Other Approach-Positive 159 Factors
A number of factors other than "credible threat," which have been
shown by studies to be linked to stalking, appear not to have been
considered by various legislators in drafting the new anti-stalking laws."6
A consideration of such additional factors would likely result in a better
understanding of the problem and in the drafting and passage of more
effective laws.
The Hollywood Study identified certain factors as being associated with
approach positive behavior:
[A] duration of correspondence of one year or longer; the...
expressi[on] [of] a desire for face-to-face contact with the
celebrity; a specific time announced when something would
happen to the celebrity; a specific location announced where
something would happen to the celebrity; repeated mention of
entertainment products; ... telephoning in addition to writing;
and the presence of two or more geographically different
postmarks.1
61
Approach negative factors were also noted in the Hollywood Study,
including the following:
[Tihe subject's using tablet-like paper; providing his or her full
address; expressing a desire to marry, have sex with, or have
children with the celebrity; enclosing commercial pictures;
attempting to instill shame in the celebrity; indicating sexual
interest in the celebrity; repeatedly mentioning other public
figures; and mentioning any sexual activity.
62
The number of communications sent was "associated with approach as an
inverted-U shaped function; the subjects who sent a total of 10 to 14
communications were those most likely to have approached."' 63
158. See Mark Tait, Gunshot Frightens Family, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 29, 1992, at B4.
159. See supra notes 146-47 (specifying characteristic "approach positive" and "approach
negative" behaviors).
160. See infra notes 161, 164 and accompanying text.
161. Hollywood Study, supra note 144, at 208.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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Similarly, the Congressional Study revealed the following approach
positive factors identified in its sample group:
[R]epetitive letter writing; providing any identifying information;
telephoning in addition to writing; closing letters appropriately;
politeness in letters; taking the role of a special constituent;
casting the member of Congress in a benefactor role, including
the roles of rescuer, benefactor, or potential benefactor; repeatedly
mentioning love, marriage, or romance; expressing a desire for
face-to-face contact with the member; and expressing a desire for
rescue, assistance, valuables or recognition.'
Certain approach negative factors were also noted in the Congressional
Study, including the following:
[C]ursive writing; taking an enemy role, including the roles of
assassin, persecutor, and condemning judge; casting the Congress
member in an enemy role, including the roles of persecutor and
conspirator; attempting to instill fear in the member; attempting
to provoke upset in the member; attempting to instill worry in the
member; and making any threat.16
Legislators have yet to draft anti-stalking bills which utilize these
approach positive and approach negative factors to identify the potentially
dangerous stalking behavior targeted by the legislation. While many of the
approach positive factors taken alone do not constitute dangerous behavior,
these studies show that when the same factors are present in varying
combinations, the results can lead to serious stalking behavior."
Continued research is needed in this area to help guide and shape future
legislation and make the anti-stalking laws more effective than they are at
present.
4. Lack of Endangered Third Party Notification
In the Hollywood Study, "[t]hirty-six percent ...mentioned some
public figure other than the celebrity to whom they had written. This
finding is one of several indications that [those] who harass or threaten one
public figure present a risk of harassing or threatening another public
164. Congressional Study, supra note 145, at 1463.
165. I.
166. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
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figure.921 67  Moreover, "this is also true of many of those who attack
public figures. ,1 68 At least two examples can readily be cited:
John Hinckley sent and delivered multiple communications to
actress Jodie Foster and called her on the telephone long before
the shooting of President Reagan and his party. Likewise, Chet
Young was known to the Secret Service for threatening the
President before he murdered the father of the singing Lennon
Sisters.1 69
Thus, "important indicators of risk to a public figure [may appear] long
before an attack on a public figure, but [are either] not received by those
who needed the information or [are] not recognized as warnings. 170
These facts underscore the need for a "central repository of informa-
tion," 171 particularly since "individual celebrities receive communications
from multiple subjects and [since] subjects writing more than a single letter
corresponded for a median duration of 11 months." 72  In order "[t]o
encompass [the most dangerous subjects] whose pursuit of public figures
will bring them within striking distance," the repository must "include all
inappropriate communications, whether threatening or not, and [records of]
all persons making inappropriate visits in search of the public figure,
whether at the true location of the public figure or not." 73
Admittedly, however, the maintenance of such a central repository
would "pose[] significant legal and policy problems... including those
governing the sharing of information and the keeping of intelligence files
on persons who have not committed a crime." 74
5. Effectiveness As Compared With Court Protective Orders
Previously, law enforcement officials and the courts relied largely on
restraining and other protective orders to protect potential victims of
stalking. 75 Often, a violation of a protective order led to actual harm to
the subject of protection before the police could take affirmative action.
76
167. Hollywood Study, supra note 144, at 207.
168. Congressional Study, supra note 145, at 1466.
169. L
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Hollywood Study, supra note 144, at 206.
173. Congressional Study, supra note 145, at 1466-67 (emphasis omitted).
174. Id. at 1466.
175. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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The newly enacted anti-stalking laws provide law enforcement officials
with a needed tool. Though generally applicable only in cases where a
"credible threat" has been made, these laws help prevent needless and often
violent harm to stalking victims. While it is too early to determine the
effectiveness of the new anti-stalking laws, it is noteworthy that as of
August 11, 1992, law enforcement officials in California had handled 145
stalking cases and made twelve arrests.'" Even though the total number
of arrests made may seem small, these statistics show that the prosecutorial
activity in this pioneering state has been strong, with the law providing
hope for many persons who would otherwise have no recourse. The
statistics in Massachusetts are also impressive. A total of forty-eight people
were jailed during the first six and one-half months after Massachusetts'
anti-stalldng law went into effect.
178
Yet, while "[a]nti-stalking laws are welcomed by both victims and law
enforcers .... nobody thinks they're the whole answer."17 Realistically,
"nothing but broad societal change will protect women from every potential
abuser." 80  Stalkers can simply "just get sneakier."' ' Moreover,
"[n]either laws nor the courts can guarantee thef- safety [of victims],
especially when according to police so many stalkers have mental
disorders.""las
Nevertheless, while the anti-stalking laws may not be the entire
solution, they do supply a valuable added protection for victims of stalkers.
They close several loopholes that protective orders, traditionally relied upon
in such cases, leave open.1 83  Protective orders first require that some
proscribable activity occur, and second that a court order be obtained
subsequent to such activity. Needless harm to a victim could be avoided
by eliminating the requirement that harmful activity occur before protection
177. World News Tonight With Peter Jennings, supra note 53.
178. Chow, supra note 46, at 13 (statement of Suffolk County Sheriff Robert Rufo).
179. Puente, supra note 10, at 9A.
180. Hohler, supra note 36, at 1.
181. Linda Mae Caristone, The Stalkers: 'Every Day Might Be My Last'; The Experts Give
Advice to Abused Women, CIH. TRIB., Sept. 13, 1992, Tempo, at 3.
182. World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, supra note 53. See also Bruce Rubenstein,
Stalker a Danger to Himself and Others; But He May Go Free, ILL. LEGAL TIMEs, June 1992,
at 18 ("For all his insanity he [Ralph Nau, who has pursued Cher, Olivia Newton-John and
Sheena Easton] is a very crafty and creative person .... Imagine what would happen if he got
out ... ).
183. See discussion supra part II.A.2 (discussing prior reliance on court protective orders and
their ineffectiveness).
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is made available to the victim," and by providing an option other than
the issuance of a restraining order that may actually trigger acts of violence
against the victim." Also, protective court orders can be less flexible,
and thereby less effective, than some state anti-stalking statutes. For
example, while court orders often require that a given individual stay a
prescribed distance away from the protected party, under many of the anti-
stalking statutes that same individual may be found guilty even if he or she
always remained one step beyond the prescribed distance. 86
B. Possible Constitutional Problems
1. Overbreadth
A number of state anti-stalking statutes may be subject to constitution-
al attack for being overbroad. A statute may be found overbroad if, in
addition to proscribing activities which may be constitutionally forbidden,
it also sweeps within its coverage speech or conduct which is protected by
the First Amendment guarantees of free speech.'87
Some critics have expressed concern that many of the statutes as
written possess a potential for misuse which would endanger the rights of
persons who were intended to be protected parties.'88 "It's possible that
an overzealous prosecutor could sweep in a lot of legally protected activity
and speech while prosecuting somebody for stalking .... ."189 Persons
with possible legitimate interests who might unwittingly be punished under
the various state statutes include private investigators, investigative
184. Some of the new anti-stalking statutes have been drafted to require a minimum of only
two acts against the victim before the accused can be prosecuted. See, e.g., supra note 112 and
accompanying text (Michigan statute). Other statutes use the term "repeatedly," which may also
be interpreted to require only two acts against the victim. See, e.g., supra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text (California statute).
185. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Morning Editian: Anti-Stalking Laws Considered by Virginia, supra note 140
(statement of Los Angeles Assistant City Attorney Alana Bowman: Many stalkers "have literally
measured the distance between a home and.., the field across the street, so they know they can
stand 110 yards away [without violating a 100-yard stay-away restraining order]. What this
enables the police officer to do is to make an arrest in those kind of fall-through-the-crack
cases.").
187. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
188. See, e.g., Nightline: Anti-Stalker Laws, supra note 45.
189. Constance L. Hays, If That Man Is Following Her, Connecticut Is Going to Follow Him,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at BI (quoting Philip S. Gutis, a spokesman for the American Civil
Liberties Union).
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reporters, photographers acting within the scope of their professional
responsibilities,1" and "parents who have been denied custody [who wish
to monitor] their children."'1 91
Although there is, as yet, no reported case of a constitutional challenge
to an anti-stalking statute, it is instructive to study the case law pertaining
to constitutional challenges of telephone harassment statutes. This type of
statute typically prohibits making telephone calls to another with the intent
to harass the receiving party."9  Several courts have addressed over-
breadth challenges to these statutes and have come to differing conclusions.
A representative example of a court opinion overturning a telephone
harassment statute is found in People v. Klick.!93 In Klick, the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that an Illinois statute which prohibited a person from
knowingly making a telephone call "[w]ith intent to annoy another""
was unconstitutionally overbroad. The court reasoned that the statute was
not limited to "unreasonable conduct" but instead applied to "any call made
with the intent to annoy." 95 The court objected that the statute "could
make criminal a single telephone call made by a consumer who wishes to
express his dissatisfaction over the performance of a product... [or] by an
irate citizen, perturbed with the state of public affairs, who desires to
express his opinion to a public official." 6 Notwithstanding the court's
invalidation of this statute, it noted that while an "intent to annoy" may not
be punishable, other similar conduct was not subject to First Amendment
protection.1" The court stated that conduct proscribed by the Constitu-
tion is
the type of unreasonable conduct which by its very nature attacks
the individual's peace of mind and solitude: e.g., terror caused to
an unsuspecting person when he or she answers the telephone,
perhaps late at night, to hear nothing but a tirade of threats,
curses, and obscenities, or, equally frightening, to hear only heavy
breathing or groaning. Clearly, this is not the type of conduct
which is protected by the first amendment."8
190. See, e.g., Seth Schiesel, Federal Measure Would Bar Stalking, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2,
1992, National/Foreign, at 5 (journalists); Ross, supra note 134, at 6 (investigative reporters).
191. Schiesel, supra note 190, at 5.
192. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1991).
193. 362 N.E.2d 329 (111. 1977).
194. Id. at 331.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 331-32.
197. Id. at 331.
198. Klick, 362 N.E.2d at 331.
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Similar statutes were overturned in State v. Dronso199 and State v.
Blair.m
Other courts which have addressed the issue of overbreadth challenges
to telephone harassment statutes have reached the opposite conclusion. In
United States v. Lampley,2"' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
47 U.S.C. § 223, which prohibited making anonymous telephone calls "with
intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person." The court
reasoned that
[n]ot all speech enjoys the protection of the first amendment, and
[that] in enacting [the statute] the Congress had a compelling
interest in the protection of innocent individuals from fear, abuse
or annoyance at the hands of persons who employ the telephone,
not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives. 3
Similarly, the court in State v. Elder'" upheld a Florida law much like
the statute at issue in Lampley. The Elder court stressed that the proscribed
conduct was not "directed at the communication of opinions or ideas, but
at conduct" intended to harass others. 05
The United States Supreme Court has only indirectly addressed the
issue of whether a statute prohibiting harassment of others (or similar
conduct) may be consistent with the First Amendment. In Boos v.
Barry,' the Court overturned a provision in a District of Columbia code
which prohibited "display [of] any flag, banner, placard, or device designed
... to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign govern-
ment.., or any officer... within 500 feet of any building... used...
as an embassy ... or for other official purposes."'' 7 The Court noted
that as a "content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum
[the ordinance] must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny."
However, while rejecting the District of Columbia ordinance, the Court
cited with approval a federal statute which "subject[ed] to criminal
199. 279 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
200. 601 P.2d 766 (Or. 1979).
201. 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978).
202. IM. at 785 n.2.
203. Id. at 787 (citations omitted).
204. 382 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1980).
205. Id. at 690. Accord Gormley v. Director, Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d 938,
941 (2d Cir.) (holding that the Connecticut legislature had a compelling interest in protecting its
citizens from fear or abuse inflicted by individuals whose primary purpose was not communica-
tion), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980).
206. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
207. Id. at 316.
208. Id. at 321 (emphasis omitted).
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punishment willful acts or attempts to 'intimidate, coerce, threaten, or
harass a foreign official."'" Thus, it seems that a statute which is
intended to protect individuals from harassment may pass constitutional
muster if it is sufficiently narrow in scope.
The Court addressed a similar issue in Frisby v. Schultz.21 In
Frisby, the Court upheld a Brookfield, Wisconsin, statute which made it
"unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the
residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield. 211
The Court focused upon the right of an individual to be free from unwanted
communication, stating that "[t]here simply is no right to force speech into
the home of an unwilling listener."212  The Court noted that picketing
targeted at an individual was "fundamentally different from more generally
directed means of communication... [in that it did] not seek to dissemi-
nate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted
resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way."213  The Court
concluded that because picketing targeted at an individual "is speech
directed primarily at those who are presumptively unwilling to receive it,
the State has a substantial and justifiable interest in banning it. The nature
and scope of this interest make the ban narrowly tailored."2 4
It is by no means certain that the Court would uphold the anti-stalking
statutes currently implemented. However, it seems likely that the conduct
prohibited by these statutes, if it is considered speech at all, would be
construed as speech directed at an unwilling recipient, which "the State has
a substantial and justifiable interest in banning."2 5
As noted in several of the foregoing cases, a statute must be substan-
tially overbroad before the law can be found to be unconstitutional.2 6
Further, state courts are likely to try to save a statute by narrowing its
construction, if possible, rather than entirely invalidating it.217 Therefore,
209. kl at 324-25.
210. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
211. M at 477.
212. IL at 485.
213. l. at 486.
214. Id. at 488.
215. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488.
216. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). "[P]articularly where conduct and not
merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id at 615.
217. See generally Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). "Courts routinely construe statutes
so as to avoid the statutes' potentially overbroad reach.. . ." Id. at 119.
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ff an anti-stalking statute is drawn in a reasonably narrow fashion, it would
likely withstand constitutional scrutiny if challenged for overbreadth.
2. Vagueness
The United States Supreme Court has held that "the terms of a penal
statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to
its penalties."2 8 A statute may be deemed unconstitutionally vague if the
conduct forbidden by it is so unclearly defined "that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."2 9
According to this standard, a number of state anti-stalking statutes may
be subject to attack for being unconstitutionally vague.' Critics may
argue that the statutory provisions do not adequately describe activities
which are proscribed. Some statutes, for example, enumerate certain
prohibited activities and then proceed to indicate an exception for activities
which are in furtherance of a "legitimate purpose" without specifying what
shall constitute such a "legitimate purpose."' Also, some statutes refer
to "following" without specifying what shall constitute following or the
distance at which following shall be deemed to take place.'m A Califor-
nia legislative committee noted that, under its anti-stalking bill,
if "A" is under a court order to keep 100 feet away from "X" and
witnesses report seeing "A" following "X" around from a distance
of 150 feet, "A" could still be prosecuted.., if "A" had the
intent to place "X" in reasonable fear of death or great bodily
injury. [Thus,] ... a person could still be prosecuted for stalking
even though he or she was not violating any court order.'
218. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
219. Id. (citing International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); Collins
v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914)).
220. For example, the California statute leaves several terms undefined. See discussion supra
part mI.A.1. See also Nightline: Anti-Stalker Laws, supra note 45 (statement of Professor
Jonathan Turley, George Washington University: "[S]ome legal behavior may be indistinguish-
able from some illegal behavior. That leaves it to the police officer to make the determination
whether somebody is a stalker, whether someone is obnoxious.").
221. See, e.g., discussion supra part E[[.A.1 (California statute).
222. 1&t
223. Proposing Establishment of New Crime of Stalking, 1990: Hearings on S. 2184 before
the CaL Assembly Comm. on Public Safety (July 3, 1990) (statement of Judith M. Garvey,
Counsel).
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Yet another example of possible vagueness in some anti-stalking statutes
is the lack of definition for what constitutes an act of "violence" or a
credible threat of "violence."'
Thus, to tighten any loopholes for possible constitutional attack for
vagueness, the statutes should, with greater particularity, define the
meanings of certain terms used within them, such as the term "legitimate
purpose."' However, the use of some other terms, such as "following,"
could be found to be satisfactory if a common definition or a reasonable
person standard is applied to discern their meaning. For example, the
violation of a court restraining order pertaining to distance to be kept from
another person would not be a prerequisite to or determinative of a finding
that one individual had been "following" another. Instead, if a reasonable
person under the same circumstances would believe he or she were being
followed, then "following" shall have occurred.
3. Procedural Due Process
Another aspect under which state statutes may be challenged is
procedural due process. 6  Specifically, some statutes could be attacked
on grounds of the inclusion of a provision for a warrantless arrest without
catching the suspect in the act of committing the crime. The Florida anti-
stalking statute, for example, allows a law enforcement officer to arrest the
accused without requiring a warrant or witnessing the crime.' 2
Generally, a law enforcement official may arrest a person without a
warrant when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has
224. See, e.g., discussion supra part llI.A.1 (California statute).
225. See, e.g., infra notes 265-67 and accompanying text (offering the author's proposal for
a definition of the term "legitimate purpose").
226. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides that the States shall not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law:' U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, criminal defendants are guaranteed that certain processes must be
followed before they may be deprived of their liberty. Some of these mandated processes include:
the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and to exclude from
criminal trials any evidence illegally seized, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); the Fifth
Amendment right to refrain from compelled self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964); and the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
to a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), to a public trial, In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948), to confrontation of opposing witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965), and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967).
227. See discussion supra part 1m.B.2.
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been committed and the person before the officer has committed it.'
Also, an officer may make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor
committed in the officer's presence. 9 But under the Florida law, only
probable cause 230 is required to arrest someone for the crime of stalking.
Thus, while the Florida statute may be constitutional when the stalking
committed is a felony, the same statute may be challenged when the
stalking committed is a misdemeanor.
However, an unlawful arrest by itself has no impact on a subsequent
criminal prosecution. Thus, if the police improperly arrest a person (e.g.,
for a misdemeanor violation, without a warrant and without witnessing the
act of violation), they may detain the person if they have probable cause to
do so, 1 and the invalid arrest is not a defense to the offense
charged. 2 The exclusionary rule, though, provides that evidence that is
the product of an unlawful arrest is inadmissible against the defendant at
trial.2
33
Additionally, certain anti-stalking statutes have been criticized for their
bail provisions.2 Iowa, for example, has created a presumption of
ineligibility for bail in felony cases of stalking,"3 and Florida is consider-
ing adding a provision which calls for automatic denial of bail to persons
arrested for stalkdng." 6 But pretrial detention without bail, pursuant to
the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 3' has been upheld as constitutional when
such detention is imposed not as a punishment for past conduct, but rather
as protection of the community from reasonably predictable future con-
228. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
229. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925). A crime is deemed
committed in the officer's "presence" if the officer is aware of it through any of his or her senses.
See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 412 F.2d 1095, 1096 (1969).
230. Probable cause to arrest is present when, at the time of the arrest, the officer has within
his or her knowledge reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a
reasonably prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime..
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
231. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990).
232. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
233. See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643.
234. See, e.g., Gem-Lind Kolarik, Stalking Laws Proliferate, 78 ABA J. 36 (Nov. 1992).
235. 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. 2025, § 2 (West) (approved Apr. 29, 1992). A defendant
charged with felony stalking "is presumed to be ineligible to be admitted to bail unless the court
determines that such release reasonably will not result in the person failing to appear as required
and will not jeopardize the personal safety of another person or persons." Id.
236. Stalking Law May Be Strengthened, supra note 81 (according to a spokeswoman forRep.
Carol Hanson).
237. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
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duct."5 Moreover, "the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts
are able to predict dangerousness with a constitutionally acceptable risk of
error.'' 39 Thus, if bail is denied not for the purpose of punishment, but
rather, as "an incident of some other legitimate purpose," then these statutes
would likely be upheld as constitutional.' However, there must be
adequate procedural safeguards in place. Among other provisions, "[i]f
detention is ordered there must be written findings of fact and a statement
of reasons for the order" which follows a "prompt hearing." ' While the
complete denial of bail, which may be reasonable under certain circum-
stances, does not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
excessive bail, if bail is set it must be at a reasonable level. 2
C. Other Possible Enforceability Issues
Generally, the commission of a crime requires both an act and a state
of mind.24 If either element is not present, then a crime has not been
committed.2 " Thus, if an anti-stalking statute is drafted without including
the element of intent, questions are raised as to the enforceability of the
statute. Such is the case with the Michigan anti-stalking law, which does
not specify intent as a requirement.' 4 Rather, the statute requires only
reasonable and actual fear or significant emotional suffering on the part of
the victim.2' Where a crime against person or property omits mention
of intent, courts will interpret the law as requiring, at a minimum, a
"reckless" state of mind. 7  However, courts which have interpreted
various harassment statutes have indicated that an intent requirement may
238. United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1451 (N.D. 111. 1984).
239. Id. at 1451-52.
240. Il at 1451 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)).
241. Id. at 1452 (citing the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3142(i)(1)) (Law. Co-op.
1984).
242. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (providing that "excessive bail shall not be required"); United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987). See also Stalking Law May Be Strengthened,
supra note 81 (statement of Ray Markey, a prosecutor who helped draft Florida's anti-stalking
law: "A person has a constitutional right to a reasonable bond .... You can't put bail at such
a level that it amounts to no bail.").
243. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRmINAL LAW 88 (1978).
244. Id.
245. See discussion supra part m.B.4.
246. Id.
247. See generally Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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be necessary for a statute to be upheld as constitutional. 8 In one case,
the court held that the specific intent requirement of a telephone harassment
statute "preclude[d] the proscription of mere communication."' 9  In
another instance, the court held that the federil telephone harassment statute
did not criminalize "mere attempts to communicate" because the statute
required punishable conduct be made with the intent to harass.' 0 Thus,
the Michigan anti-stalking statute, or any other statute drafted without
including intent as an element of the crime, could be found constitutionally
infirm for that reason alone.
V. PROPOSAL
It was clear that this man, who is apparently crazy, was not
going to let up, and the authorities were powerless to stop him.
Though he was free to move about, I was living in a state of
siege. 2 1
A. Enlarging Punishable "Stalking" Behaviors
In an effort to consolidate the most effective elements of the existing
anti-stalking statutes and to further address the problems discussed above,
the following proposal is offered. The first element pertains to enlarging
the potential reach of the statutes.
A primary concern with the newly created anti-stalking statutes is that
they generally apply only in cases where a "credible threat" is present.z 2
Limiting the application of the anti-stalking laws solely to danger of
physical harm addresses only part of the problem. Stalking can equally
terrorize persons who experience any form of substantial emotional distress
whether or not they specifically fear physical harm. The anti-stalking
statutes need to encompass all forms of substantial emotional distress, and
not be limited to fear of physical harm, to more fully address the problems
of victims. However, when substantial emotional harm is experienced by
a victim, that harm should be reasonable to help prevent misuse of the
248. See infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 138-43 and
accompanying text (arguing that an intent requirement may help mitigate the possibility of
innocent activity or mistakes being punished).
249. Gormley, 632 F.2d at 941 (quoting Lampley, 573 F.2d at 787).
250. Lampley, 573 F.2d at 787 (referring to 14 U.S.C. § 233).
251. News: Stalking Victims Turn to Congress for Help, supra note 7.
252. See, e.g., supra note 60 and accompanying text (California statute).
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statute. Florida takes a two-tiered approach which serves as a useful model.
In Florida, stalking is a misdemeanor when a person "willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows or harasses another person." 3 The term "harass-
es" encompasses "conduct directed at a specific person that causes
substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate
purpose."'  Aggravated stalking, a felony, occurs when a person
commits stalking "and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that
person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury." 5  Thus, Florida's
approach attaches a higher penalty in cases of threat of physical injury but
also recognizes emotional harm for which a lesser degree of punishment is
justified. However, Florida does not require that the substantial emotional
distress experienced by the victim be reasonable, thus opening the door to
possible abuse of the statute. Similarly, Michigan has a two-tiered statute
which recognizes significant emotional harm, but Michigan requires that the
emotional harm suffered be reasonable 6
Another concern is that most statutes only address physical approach-
ing and following of victims as activities punishable under the anti-stalking
statutes.257 These statutes fail to recognize that a victim may reasonably
feel fear or substantial emotional distress from unwanted contact by
telephone, other electronic media, the mail, or objects otherwise placed
upon the victim's property. Michigan's statute serves as a model of how
these additional types of unconsented contacts can be incorporated into anti-
stalking legislation to help make it more effective. 8
Additionally, threats to the safety of not only the victim but also a
member of the victim's family should be covered. 9 However, legislators
need to carefully consider where the boundaries should be drawn. Should
unmarried cohabitants or close acquaintances be included? California's
recent amendment incorporates threats against both a given person and a
member of that person's immediate family.' Oklahoma, too, uses the
"immediate family" standard to identify the boundaries of the reach of the
law in that state. 1  Oklahoma defines the phrase "member of the
immediate family" to include "any spouse, parent, child, person related
253. 1992 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 208, § 2 (West).
254. L § 1(a).
255. Id. § 3.
256. See discussion supra part I.B.4.b.
257. See, e.g., discussion supra part lI.B.I.b (Connecticut statute).
258. See discussion supra part Im.B.4 (Michigan statute).
259. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity or any other person who
regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the household
within the prior six (6) months."'262 This definitional approach is useful,
giving clear guidance to courts and law enforcement officials. However,
the six-month limitation on unrelated household members may be too brief
because the "familial" characteristics gained during a period of cohabitation
may remain even after six months. Therefore, legislators should consider
broadening the unrelated cohabitant time limit, perhaps to one year.
However, broadening the scope to include mere close acquaintances,
without the requirement of those acquaintances cohabiting within the past
year, should probably not be included since the likelihood of harm is so
remote.
B. Safeguards
While the preceding discussion argues for enlarging the scope of anti-
stalking statutes, certain safeguards must also be incorporated in the statutes
to protect an individual's civil liberties. Thus, the statutes should require
that: (1) the acts are repetitive; (2) the acts are committed with the
intent 63 to cause fear in the victim; and (3) such fear is actually and
reasonably experienced by the victim.' The requirement of repetitive-
ness is central to the act of stalking; however, it remains questionable
whether two acts alone should be deemed to constitute the pattern of
behavior that must be shown. Perhaps a sliding scale approach could be
incorporated whereby three acts would normally constitute the requisite
pattern of behavior, but two acts would be sufficient if those acts were
substantially severe or threatening.
C. Addition of Definition of "Legitimate Purpose"; Presumption
A number of the state anti-stalldng laws provide for an exception to
their application when a person is acting for a "legitimate purpose," without
clearly identifying what such a "legitimate purpose" might be. The use of
this phrase without definition creates the potential for confusion or
uncertainty as to a statute's application under given circumstances. Even
if certain activities are specified as constituting a legitimate purpose
262. 1992 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 107, § 1(e) (West).
263. See discussion supra part IV.C.
264. See, e.g., supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (California statute).
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generally, under certain circumstances those same activities may not or
should not be deemed to be carried out for a legitimate purpose.
To remedy this problem of definition, the following provision is
proposed as an addition to, or modification of, existing state stalking
statutes:
There is a rebuttable presumption that each of the following
examples of activities constitutes a "legitimate purpose" under
this statute:
a. activities of law enforcement officials or private investigators
conducted as a part of official investigations;
b. activities of members of the press conducted within the scope
of their professional employment;' and
c. activities of persons during picketing that is otherwise law-
ful.
267
While this proposal does not limit the activities that potentially may
be deemed to be carried out for a "legitimate purpose," it specifies certain
activities that are presumed to be carried out for a "legitimate purpose."
However, not all activities of certain classes of individuals are included.
For example, some off-duty activities of law enforcement officials which
are not conducted as a part of official investigations or are otherwise
unlawful would fall outside the scope of the available exemption. The
same would be true, for example, of activities of members of the press
(including both reporters and photographers) which are not conducted
within the scope of their professional employment, and with picketing that
is in violation of the law. But, even if activities are conducted within the
scope of the statute, there is only a presumption they are conducted for a
"legitimate purpose." The burden would then revert to the plaintiff to show
that the purpose was not official or was otherwise unlawful to disallow the
exemption in a given case.
265. See, e.g., Sonya Live: Stalker Laws (CNN television broadcast, June 8, 1992) ("[M]y
sister was being stalked for about two years and the problem was that he was a police sergeant.").
266. See, e.g., Schiesel, supra note 190, at 5; Ross, supra note 134, at 6; Sonya Live: Stalker
Laws, supra note 265.
267. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (Deering Supp. 1993) (labor picketing); 1992 Il.
Laws 870, §§ 12-7.3(c), 12-7.4(c) (labor picketing); Wayne King, New Jersey Adopts Law On
Curfews, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, §1, at 56 (picketing); Sonya Live: Stalker Laws, supra note
265 (political dissidents).
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D. Enhanced Penalties
Several states provide for enhanced penalties under specific circum-
stances. Situations where enhanced penalties are presently used include:
a violation of a court order in effect at the time of the offense,' a
violation of a condition of probation," a second or subsequent conviction
against the same victim,27° a threat directed against the victim's physical
safety," the confinement or restraint of the victim, 2 actual physical
harm suffered by the victim," and stalking a person who is a minor. 4
An enhanced penalties approach is useful and would likely serve as a
deterrent in a number of cases.
E. Bail Provisions
While a court may entirely deny bail in certain circumstances, such
denial should occur only after a prompt hearing before a judge.27
However, if bail is to be set, the court should consider a number of factors
in setting the amount of bail. Such factors should include not only whether
the defendant is likely to appear at trial, but also whether the defendant has
a prior violent history, whether the defendant has violated an existing
restraining order, whether the defendant has violated a prior statute, and
whether a minor is the subject of obsession. 6
268. See, e.g., supra note 62 and accompanying text (California statute); note 79 and
accompanying text (Connecticut statute); note 89 and accompanying text (Florida statute); note
99 and accompanying text (illinois statute).
269. See, e.g., supra note 116 and accompanying text (Michigan statute).
270. See, e.g., supra note 63 and accompanying text (California statute).
271. See, e.g., supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (Florida statute); note 116 and
accompanying text (Michigan statute).
272. See, e.g., supra note 99 and accompanying text (Illinois statute).
273. See, e.g., id.
274. See, e.g., supra note 79 and accompanying text (Connecticut statute) (where the stalker's
target is under sixteen years of age).
275. See supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text. See also Judges Uphold Nursing Home
Ta, No-Bail on Stalking Charges, UPI, Sept. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt
File ('Ihe law includes a safeguard that a judge first must hold a hearing to order someone be
held without bail.").
276. See, e.g., supra note 102 and accompanying text (Illinois statute).
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F Notice of Parole or Release From Jail
Additionally, anti-stalking statutes can be drafted to include provision
for notification of the victim upon the defendant's parole or release from
jail.277 Such notice would enable the victim to take appropriate measures
to help prevent possible further harm.
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Louis Brandeis identified the "right to be left alone
(as) the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men. ". . . There should have been no need for little
Caty of Vermont to bequeath her doll collection to friends.
Indeed, no American should feel that they have no place to turn
when they are the prey of stalkers.278
Stalking-often directed at entertainment and other public figures-is a
particularly terroristic form of crime.2 79 Before enactment of the state
anti-stalking laws, victims often had to experience actual physical harm
before legal recourse was made available to them."0 The most common
remedy, the issuance of court protective orders, was often ineffective.2"'
277. See, e.g., Laura E. Keeton, Senate Panel Approves Proposed Stalking Bill, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 10, 1993, at A20.
278. 138 CONG. REc. 59527 (daily ed. July 1, 1992) (legislative day June 16, 1992)
(statement of Sen. Cohen).
279. Psychological Assault-More Effective Laws Needed to Protect Victims of Stalkers,
SEATTLE TiMES, Nov. 7, 1992, at All (letter to editor) ("Stalldng is one of the most terrorizing
forms of violence .... It constitutes hunting, battering and menacing of an individual through
psychological tactics. Too often, the lethal nature of this kind of abuse is ignored and leads to
tragic and fatal circumstances for its victims."); Crack Down on Stalkers, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Jan. 13, 1993, at 18A ("Stalking isn't just harassment. It's terrorism. It's also
often a prelude to more violent crime."); Ann Hodges, CBS Stalking Story Is Bizarre But True,
Hous. CHRON., Feb. 9, 1993, Houston, at 6 (statement of Richard Thomas, actor playing villain
in television stalking drama: "The thing that's so disturbing about this is that terror does not
come with a terrifying mask. This guy starts out as just somebody who wants to go out to dinner.
At what point does he cross the line into a psychotic situation?"). See also Larry Dougherty, 'I've
been mentally raped,' ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, Pasco Times, at 1 (I feel that I've
been mentally raped," stated one victim whose name was withheld.).
280. See discussion supra part H.A.l.
281. See discussion supra part I.A.2.
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Not only have court orders often not been enforced, but their issuance has
sometimes triggered the violent acts intended to be avoided.'
Recognizing these limitations in the existing law, and frequently in
response to local tragedies, a number of state legislatures have recently
passed anti-stalking laws.'s With the exception of California, which
passed its original law in 1990,m ' virtually all states have passed their
statutes during the past year.s Other states have bills pending.m6 In
their infancy, the anti-stalking statutes have been characterized as "experi-
mental," and some may be vulnerable to attack for their effectiveness
and enforceability. They have been challenged not only for narrowness in
scope and general ineffectiveness,s but also for overbreadth, vagueness,
failure to meet procedural due process requirements, and other enforceabil-
ity issues. m9 Yet, the laws can be made both more effective and enforce-
able, as detailed in the analysis and proposal sections of this Comment.2"
Strengthening the effectiveness and enforceability of state anti-stalking
statutes is an urgent need. Tightly woven statutes can provide a solid basis
for legal intervention, when it is necessary, to prevent physical or emotional
harm from occurring.
Braulio Montesino*
282. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 15 (listing states which have passed anti-stalking statutes as of January
1, 1993, and states which have anti-stalking statutes under consideration).
284. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., supra notes 72, 80, 91, 104, 118, 126 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 15.
287. Palmer, supra note 9 (statement of Michigan State Representative Perry Bullard: "We
are writing experimental legislation.").
288. See discussion supra part IV.A.
289. See discussion supra part IV.B.
290. See discussion supra parts IV-V.
* The author wishes to thank Nargis Choudhry, without whose assistance and support this
Comment would not have been possible.
